CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1379
23 January 1996

Original: ENGLISH

Agenda for the 1996 Session

(Adopted at the 721st plenary meeting on 23 January 1996)

The Conference, pending the conclusion of its consultations on the review of its agenda, and without prejudice to their outcome, decides to adopt the following agenda for its 1996 session.

1. Nuclear test ban.

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

3. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.

4. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

5. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.

7. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.

8. Transparency in armaments.

9. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The Conference, in accordance with its decision on expansion of membership, contained in document CD/1356, will keep the early implementation of that decision under constant review.

GE.96-60248

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1380
23 January 1996

Original: ENGLISH

DECISION

on the reestablishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban

(adopted at the 721st plenary meeting on 23 January 1996)

The Conference on Disarmament, keeping in mind General Assembly resolution 50/65, decides to immediately reestablish, under agenda item 1, in accordance with its rules of procedure, the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban with its current mandate (CD/1238).

The Conference further decides to appoint Ambassador Jaap Ramaker of the Netherlands as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee for the 1996 session.

GE.96-60254

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1381
26 January 1996

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 23 JANUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF TURKEY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXT OF A STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS DATED 17 JANUARY 1996, CONCERNING THE INTRODUCTION BY TURKEY OF A COMPREHENSIVE MORATORIUM ON ALL ANTI-PERSONNEL LAND-MINE EXPORTS AND TRANSFERS, FOR A RENEWABLE TERM OF THREE YEARS

I have the honour to communicate to you the text of a statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey issued on 17 January 1996, concerning the introduction by Turkey of a comprehensive moratorium on all anti-personnel land-mine exports and transfers, for a renewable term of three years.

I would be grateful if you would issue this text as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute it to all member States and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed): Tugay Uluçevik
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

STATEMENT OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF TURKEY

"The United Nations General Assembly has been calling on Member States, through its resolutions since 1993, to implement a moratorium on the export of mines as an important part of the efforts to limit the spread of anti-personnel land-mines.

In his various reports on the issue, the United Nations Secretary-General has persistently drawn attention to the grave consequences of the problem of mines.

On the other hand, it is a regrettable fact that mines are being indiscriminately used by terrorist organizations targeting everyone, including women and children.

As a tangible expression of our sensitivity on this important issue, Turkey has in effect been implementing a 'de facto' moratorium by not exporting any mines in recent years. In order to give this de facto national ban greater effectiveness at an international level, Turkey has now decided, on a unilateral basis, to declare a comprehensive moratorium on all anti-personnel land-mine exports and transfers, for a renewable term of three years.

It is our hope that this decision will encourage our neighbours, who have yet to take the necessary steps on this issue, to adopt a decision in the same direction."

Ankara, 17 January 1996

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1382
5 February 1996

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 2 FEBRUARY 1996 ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT BY THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, TRANSMITTING A STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE START II NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION TREATY WITH RUSSIA, AND A WHITE HOUSE RELEASE FROM THE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY CONTAINING BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON START II RATIFICATION

As I mentioned during my plenary statement of February 1, attached are copies of a Statement by the President on the Senate Ratification of the START II Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, and a White House release from the Office of the Press Secretary containing Background Information on START II Ratification.

I would be grateful if you would issue these documents as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament and distribute them to all member states and non-member participants in the work of the CD.

(Signed): Stephen J. Ledogar
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 26, 1996

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT ON THE SENATE RATIFICATION OF THE START II NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION TREATY WITH RUSSIA

Today, Senate Democrats and Republicans, working together, have increased the security of the American people by ratifying the START II Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia. I applaud this historic step. As I stated in my State of the Union address this week, it will make every American, every Russian and people all over the world more secure.

START II requires dramatic cuts in the nuclear arsenals of our two countries. Together with the START I Treaty, which we put into force in December 1994, it will eliminate submarine, bomber and land based missile launchers that carried more than 14,000 warheads -- two-thirds of the nuclear arsenal the United States and the former Soviet Union maintained at the height of the Cold War. START II will also eliminate the most destabilizing type of nuclear weapon -- the multiple warhead ICBM. Starting with President Nixon, six American presidents from both parties have worked to control and reduce the number of nuclear weapons. President Bush negotiated START II and submitted it to the Senate in January, 1993. I am proud that we have seized the opportunity presented by the end of the Cold War to take this big step back from the nuclear precipice.

As president, my most basic duty is to protect the security of the American people. That's why I have made reducing the nuclear threat one of my highest priorities.

As a result, for the first time since the dawn of the nuclear age, there are no Russian missiles pointed at our people. We convinced Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan to give up the nuclear weapons left on their land when the Soviet Union broke up. We persuaded North Korea to freeze its dangerous nuclear weapons program under international monitoring. We're working with countries around the world to safeguard and destroy nuclear weapons and materials -- so that they don't fall into the hands of terrorists or criminals. We led global efforts to win the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty which bans the spread of nuclear weapons to states that do not have them.

Now, as I urged in the State of the Union, we must do even more to give the American people real, lasting security. We can end the race to create new nuclear weapons by signing a truly comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty this year. We can outlaw forever poison gas if the Senate ratifies the Chemical Weapons Convention this year. We can take the fight to terrorists who would acquire terrible weapons of mass destruction if Congress finally passes legislation I proposed after Oklahoma City to give American law enforcement an even stronger arsenal.

Working together, I believe we can and we will take all these important steps to increase the security of the American people.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release January 26, 1996

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

START II RATIFICATION

THE PURPOSE OF START II

The principal U.S. objective in strategic arms control is to increase stability at significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons. START II is an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement that reduces the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and the warheads on them. Overall strategic nuclear forces will be reduced by an additional 5,000 warheads beyond the 9,000 Warheads being reduced under START I.

THE START II PARTIES

The START II Treaty was negotiated by the United States and Russia between 1991 and 1992 and submitted to the Senate by President George Bush following signature on January 1993.

START II's CENTRAL FEATURES

The START II Treaty builds upon the START I Treaty signed on July 31, 1991, between the United States and the Soviet Union. All START I provisions will pertain, except as explicitly modified in the new Treaty. It will remain in force throughout the duration of START I (START I has a 15-year duration and can be extended for successive 5-year periods by agreement among the Parties).

The Treaty will set equal ceilings on the number of strategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed by either side. Ceilings will be set for two phases: Phase One to be completed seven years after entry into force of the START I Treaty (START I entered into force on December 5, 1994) and Phase Two to be completed by the year 2003. Phase Two may be completed by the end of the year 2000 if the United States can help finance the elimination of strategic offensive arms in Russia.

-- Phase One: By the end of the first phase, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,800-4,250. Those include the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as well as the number of warheads for which heavy bombers with nuclear missions are equipped. Of the total of 3,800-4,250 warheads, no more than 1,200 may be on deployed MIRVed ICBMS, no more than 2,160 may be on deployed SLBMs, and no more than 650 may be on deployed heavy ICBMS.

-- Phase Two: By the end of the second and final phase, each side must have reduced its total deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500. Of those, none may be on MIRVed ICBMs, including heavy ICBMs. Thus, all MIRVed ICBMs must be eliminated from each side's deployed forces; only ICBMs carrying a single-warhead will be allowed. No more than 1,700-1,750 deployed warheads may be on SLBMs. There will be no prohibition on MIRVed SLBMs.

DOWNLOADING

The Treaty will allow for a reduction in the number of warheads on certain ballistic missiles. Such "downloading" will be permitted in a carefully structured fashion, modifying the rules agreed in START I.

-- Each side will be able to download two existing types of ballistic missiles by up to four warheads each, in addition to the U.S. Minuteman III and the Russian SS-N-18. There will be no aggregate limits on the number of warheads that can be downloaded.

-- A limit of 105 ICBMs of one of those types may be downloaded by up to five warheads each. Such an ICBM may only be deployed in silos in which it was deployed at the time of START signature.

Thus, the three-warhead U.S. Minuteman III ICBM, the four-warhead Russian SS- 17 ICBM and 105 of the six-warhead Russian SS-19 ICBMs will be able to be downloaded to a single warhead, to comply with the requirement to eliminate all MIRVed ICBMS. The U.S. Peacekeeper ICBMs and the Russian SS-18 heavy ICBMs and SS-24 ICBMs must all be eliminated, in accordance with START procedures.

MISSILE SYSTEM ELIMINATION

In START I, deployed SLBMs and most deployed ICBMs may be removed from accountability either by destroying the launchers (silos for fixed ICBMS, mobile launchers for mobile ICBMs, and launcher sections of submarines for SLBMs), or by converting those launchers so that they can only carry another type of permitted missile. The one exception is the SS-18; under START I, the requirement to eliminate 154 deployed SS-18s must be met through silo destruction, not conversion.

Under START II, those rules generally will continue to apply. The major exception will again be the SS-18. Ninety SS-18 silos may be converted to carry a single-warhead missile, which Russia has said will be an SS-25-type. The Treaty will lay out specific procedures, including on-site inspections, to ensure that those converted silos will never again be able to launch a heavy ICBM. The remaining 64 SS-18 silos subject to this Treaty will have to be destroyed.

In exchange for the right to retain up to 90 converted SS-18 silos, the Treaty will require that all SS-18 missiles and canisters, both deployed and non-deployed, be eliminated no later than January 1, 2003. This is a major change from the START I Treaty. Generally, START I did not seek destruction of missiles. But in START II, the Russians have agreed to eliminate all SS-18 missiles, both deployed and non-deployed. This fully achieves a long-standing U.S. goal, the complete elimination of heavy ICBMS.

HEAVY BOMBERS

In START 1, nuclear heavy bombers are subject to more flexible counting rules than are ballistic missiles. Each heavy bomber equipped to carry only short-range missiles or gravity bombs counts as one warhead. U.S. heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) each count as 10 warheads, and Soviet heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range nuclear ACLMs each count as eight warheads.

In START II, heavy bombers will be counted using the number of nuclear weapons -- whether long-range nuclear ALCMs, short-range missiles or gravity bombs -- for which they are actually equipped. This number will be specified in the Treaty Memorandum on Attribution and will be confirmed by a one-time exhibition and by routine START on-site inspections.

Another new feature of this Treaty will be the provision that up to 100 heavy bombers that have never been accountable under the START I Treaty as long-range-nuclear-ALCM heavy bombers may be reoriented to a conventional role. Such bombers will not count against the Treaty warhead limits. They will be based separately from heavy bombers equipped for nuclear weapons, will be used only for non-nuclear missions, and will have observable differences from other heavy bombers of the same type that are not reoriented to a conventional role. Such heavy bombers may be returned to a nuclear role after three months notification, but then may not be reoriented again to a conventional role.

VERIFICATION

The comprehensive START I verification regime will continue to apply to the new Treaty. In addition, START II will include some new verification measures, such as observation of SS-18 silo conversion and missile elimination procedures, exhibitions and inspections of all heavy bombers to confirm weapon loads, and exhibitions of heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role to confirm their observable differences.

(End text)

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1383
19 February 1996

ENGLISH
Original: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING A MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF COOPERATION IN SECURITY MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST

During the recent Regional Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures, the representatives of the Argentine Republic and the Republic of Chile signed a Memorandum of Understanding for the Strengthening of Cooperation in Security Matters of Mutual Interest, which we attach with a request for it to be distributed as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Juan Carlos Sánchez Arnau
Ambassador

(Signed) Jorge Berguño Barnes
Ambassador

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC AND THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF COOPERATION IN SECURITY MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST

BEARING IN MIND the two countries' vocation for peace,

REAFFIRMING their full respect for international law and the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Charter of the Organization of American States,

REAFFIRMING the commitment entered into in the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship to solve their disputes by peaceful means and not to resort to the threat or the use of force,

COMMITTED to the strengthening of democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, the process of regional integration and the economic and social development of their peoples,

ENDORSING the decision of the twenty-first General Assembly of the Organization of American States, held in Santiago, Chile, in 1991, to hold a process of consultations on security in the Americas, in the light of the new regional and world situation,

BEARING IN MIND the recommendations of the meeting of experts on measures for the strengthening of mutual trust, held in Buenos Aires in March 1994,

CONVINCED that the intensification of understanding and cooperation in security matters will make a significant contribution to cooperation between the two countries,

REAFFIRMING their commitment to the resolutions of the United Nations and the Organization of American States concerning the Register of Conventional Arms and defence expenditure,

DETERMINED to strengthen still further mutual solidarity and trust, as fundamental factors underlying the natural yearning of the peoples of Argentina and Chile for peace,

DECIDE:

1. To establish a Permanent Committee on Security whose purpose shall be to draw up a programme of work which will enable cooperation between Argentina and Chile in security matters to be enhanced.

2. The Permanent Committee on Security shall be composed of one representative of the respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, at the rank of Under-Secretary or Ambassador. Representatives of the National Defence General Staff of the Republic of Chile and the Joint General Staff of the Argentine Republic may also participate. In relevant matters, the Committee may be assisted by advisers designated by the respective authorities.

3. The Committee shall have a Secretary who will operate by means of a system of annual rotation between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the two countries.

4. This Committee shall meet regularly, alternately in Argentina and Chile, at least twice a year.

5. It shall be the aim of the Committee to further the application of measures to enhance cooperation between Argentina and Chile in security matters of mutual interest, including:

A. Strengthening of channels of communication in the defence field.

B. Rapid and timely provision of information concerning those military manoeuvres which the parties agree shall be notified in advance, with encouragement given to participation by observers.

C. Fostering of academic activity which strengthens cooperation between the two countries in security matters.

DONE in Santiago, Chile, on the eighth day of November nineteen hundred and ninety-five, in two copies, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC

FERNANDO ENRIQUE PETRELLA
SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND LATIN AMERICAN MATTERS

RICARDO LAGORIO
UNDER-SECRETARY FOR POLICY
AND STRATEGY IN THE
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

FOR THE REPUBLIC OF CHILE

MARIANO FERNANDEZ AMUNATEGUI
UNDER-SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

PABLO CABRERA GAETE
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